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Eastern Africa is not so thoroughly militarized a region as
the west or north of the continent; yet four states in the area
are soldier-governed (Burundi, Uganda, Sudan and Somalia), and
the armed forces seem likely to play an important role in poli-
tical developments in Kenya and Tanzania in the near future. An
assessment of the implications of military dominance for develop-
ment in the region is therefore clearly important, albeit com-
plicated by the wide disparities between the various countries
involved. But some comparisons can be made about the military
governments themselves. The young military men who seized power
in Burundi (1966), Sudan (May 1969), and the Somali Democratic
Republic (October 1969) certainly saw themselves as the embod-
iment of militant nationalism, even of socialism, overcoming
a discredited, corrupt and reactionary political old guard.
(In Burundi, the list of obsolete institutions and personalities
included the throne and its occupant). In Uganda (January 1971)
on the other hand, ideological justifications were equally in
evidence, but the coup-makers' position was anti-socialist if
anything. While there were reasons internal to the army for the
coup, it was also neatly timed to thwart President Obote's
plans for implementing a "Move to the Left" and general elect-
ions under an electoral system which would have made it impos-
sible for any MP to be elected without considerable pan-tribal
support.
But new military governments, like most governments, are
rarely merely what they seem to be, or at least they rarely
remain so. This year, for example, has provided bloody evidence
against President Micombero's claim to be anything other than
the latest and most brutal weapon of the Tutsi ascendancy over
Burundi's Hutu majority. If the reports of the killings which
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have continued since May this year are anywhere near the
truth, the Burundi army has responded to an abortive Hutu
rebellion by slaughtering most present and likely members of
the emergent Hutu educated class, even down to some secondary
school pupils.
In the Sudan, an attempt at a counter-coup in July 1971
also provoked bloody, though much more limited, reprisals - in
this case, the government of President Jafaar el-Nimeiri took
the opportunity of summarily executing the country's leading
Communists, and thereafter trying to expunge the Party's in-
fluence from the national life, apparently with only limited
success. Much blood has been shed in Uganda, too, where it is
almost certain that some thousands of soldiers and civilians
have been killed, most of them from the allegedly 'pro-Obote'
Langí and Acholi tribes. Somalia, in the hands of a Marxist-
oriented officer group, has so far avoided bloodshed, even
that of the leaders of an unsuccessful counter-coup in May
1971.
But despite the cost in human lives which these coups
d'etat brought in their wake, their significance must ultima-
tely be evaluated in other terms as well. Military coups are
the outcome of the incapacity of governing elites to cope with
the problems of underdevelopment, of social and economic change
and political control which confront them: the incoming
officer groups are more or less explicit, after their individ-
ual fashions, about the sources of this incapacity and, by
contrast, about their own determination and ability to 'do the
3ob'. What, therefore, has changed either in development stra-
tegy pursued or development achievements since these countries
have been under military rule?
On the whole, the picture is a bleak one. In Burundi,
1971 saw some improvement over the huge foreign trade deficits
of earlier years, which had been running at about £4 million -
in a country with total annual exports of £5 million Con-
sumer goods accounted for about 75 per cent of the import bill.
But even after the improvements of 1970 and 1971, which were
exceptionally good years for coffee (the main export crop), it
required heavy aid contributions from Belgium and the EEC to
push the balance of payments into surplus, though with few
signs of systematic curbs on consumer imports. And one of the
outcomes of the butchery in 1972 is likely to be a downturn in
coffee production, since thousands of Hutu peasants have been
fleeing their coffee holdings at the approach of army patrols,
and not returning.
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The Sudan Revolutionary Command Council had much more
radical and systematic economic change in mind than President
Micombero ever did. The Five Year Plan published in 1970 anti-
cipated fundamental structural change through nationalization
of foreign concerns and of the commandíng heights' of the
economy, and also an end to the old system of deficit finan-
cing and rapidly mounting public debt. The Plan, prepared with
Soviet assistance, nevertheless assumed that about 60% of
total investment of £385 million over the five years would
come from the private sector. The political upheavals of the
ensuing two years, however, as much as the difficulty of
effecting such thoroughgoing reforms, have cast doubt on the
regime's continued commitment to the strategy enshrined in
the Plan, let alone on its ability to implement it. Some of
the nationalization measures were reversed after the defeat
of the Communist-supported counter-coup in 1971, explicitly
because, according to President Nimeiri, "national capitalists"
had been unfairly treated in the early days of the Revolution.
At the same time, the Government's internal debt has climbed
to over £100 million, compared to £63 million when it came to
power. The indications are not particularly encouraging in an
economy in which, according to the new series of national
accounts, real per capita GNP probably stagnated for seven
years before the Nimeiri takeover.
These disappointments are very much related to the vaga-
ries of internal and international politics, and particularly
to the great current issues in Sudan politics of relations
with the negro south of the country, which had up till this
year been in a state of rebellion against the Arab north of
the country, and of relations with the Arab world - issues
which have always pulled Sudanese leaders in opposite direct-
ions. In this context of pressure from Sadat and Gaddafy to
make the United Arab Republic a reality, and a fragile peace
to preserve in the South, the complications of dealing with
urban workers and employers, with Gezira scheme tenants, and
with an intelligentsia of a highly politicised and generally
radical kind, let alone with the Sudan's politico-religious
Ansar and Khatmiya sects - all these pressures and conflicts
have tended to lead rather swiftly to policies and political
styles not too different from the bad old days of 'the poli-
The economic strategy of General Amin's government on
its seizure of power was simplicity itself: the nationalization
measures of the Obote regime were immediately reversed. Some
80 enterprises had been instructed by Obote to cede 60 per
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cent of their equity to the Government, but Amin proposed that
only 18 of these companies, mainly banks and insurance firms,
should cede not 60 but 49 per cent to the state. Reports of
'encouraging signs of a resumption of the flow of overseas
investment capital were somewhat premature, however: foreign
investors seem to have been as wary of instability and unrest
under the Amin regime as they were of nationalization and
moves to the left under Obote. The Third Five Year Plan
published last year anticipates an annual GDP growth rate of
6 per cent, necessitating total investment of Uganda f350 mil.
over the plan period, some 60 per cent of it from local
sources. The omens are not particularly good. Development ex-
penditure in 1971 was reduced by some 50 per cent from its
1970 level to Uganda £33 million, and about 60 per cent of an
estimated Uganda £4 million budgetary deficit was due to be
financed by an increase in the issue of money. At the same
time, the preoccupation of the regime with trying to placate
or control restive and disparate domestic groups has made for
an extremely unpredictable political environment for making
economic decisions. Thus the recent decision that all non-
citizen Asians are to be expelled within a matter of months may
indeed have been taken, as has been suggested, to create em-
ployment and spoils for a rising and restive petty bourgeoisie.
It is clearly also going to have a sharp impact on domestic
(and maybe foreign) investment, and on illegal capital flight.
But perhaps it is useless to evaluate General Amin's Uganda in
these terms. Certainly the General, who likes to refer to
various sections of Ugandan society as "the units" (í.e. of an
army), seems primarily concerned with other things, of which
just staying afloat politically is currently probably uppermost
(there have been at least one coup attempt and incessant
rumours of others in his 18-odd months in power)
Somalia is by far the most backward of the four countries.
Sixty per cent of its estimated 3 million people are nomadic
cattle, camel and goat keepers, and a further 20 per cent are
settled herdsmen and farmers. Per capita income is 455 shil-
lings a year (17.4 Somali shillings to the L), and opportuni-
ties for non-agricultural employment are minuscule: secondary
school graduates in particular are having difficulty finding
jobs. There are only two perennial rivers in the country, and
the problems of drought have been exacerbated by Ethiopian ob-
struction of Somali attempts to use traditional and vital
grazing grounds which were ceded to Ethiopia before independ-
ence in 1960 - obstruction which has led to armed clashes on
several occasions.
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The development programme for 1971-73 set out by the
Supreme Revolutionary Council is therefore modest. Though its
explicit philosophy is socialist and Marxist, the programme
recognizes that the poverty of the country necessitates not
only the continuation of the mixed economy, but also an
initial powerful emphasis on rural improvements, communications
and institutional development, rather than on attempts at
socialist transformation. Thus the programme concentrates on
improvement of basic services to livestock and agriculture,
especially in the fields of veterinary services, water provi-
sion, range management and marketing, while efforts are also
being made through state corporations to expand the export
of meat rather than livestock (which at present accounts for
over 50 per cent of total exports of 224 million shillings,
and nearly all goes to Saudi Arabia). A National Banana Agency
has been set up to rationalize production and marketing of the
second biggest export, under severe pressure from the closure
of the Suez Canal and the loss of preferences in the Italian
market.
But some of the most interesting aspects of the Somali
rulers' development ideas are those concerning social change
and politics. Considerable attention is paid to "enlightening
the masses to the realities and needs of national development
through political orientation and proper national guidance"1,
and all civil servants have been required to undergo fairly
arduous political education and indoctrination courses (some-
times as part of the process of weeding out anti-regime
elements), as do army officers. A new scheme of compulsory
National Service will involve young school leavers in a similar
activity for one year, followed by a further year engaged in
teaching or other activities.
There is also an explicit but necessarily cautious com-
mitment to combat the negative effects of nomadism and tribalism.
Thus an important part of the government's well-digging
programme is to ensure that the wells are kept open to all
tribes or clans in the area, and that the opportunity is taken
to explain government policies and 'make revolutionary pro-
paganda' when pastoralists arrive with their herds (shades of
the Machine and Tractor Stations). Administrative decentral-
ization, the promotion of self-help schemes and in particular
the establishment of rural co-operatives are seen as integral
to the effort to encourage communal participation and co-
1 Development Programme 1971-73, chapter I) Ministry of Plan-
ning and Coordination, Mogadishu, 1971.
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operation in the development process, while the Department of
Labour in particular sees a major part of its task as being
concerned not only with wider distribution of wealth and em-
ployment opportunities, but with a deeper understanding of the
consequences of internal migration and nomadism, and of the
possibilities of integrating the segmented and isolated nomad
groups into the resource planning process'.
But President Syad Barre and his Council have, in a sense,
only begun to expose to themselves the central problems of
military rule. The new Somali rulers have had several advan-
tages - in the continued and expanded economic and political
support of the Soviet Union, in the fact that the army officer
corps, and particularly the young officers, form a fairly co-
herent Marxist political base (an attempt by two Revolutionary
Council members to stage a counter-coup in May last year with
the assistance of some members of the old regime and its
supporters was apparently easily crushed without generating
significant differences within the armed forces). But, like
other much worse military regimes, the Somali government has
yet to overcome the major obstacles of establishing a secure
political base, and (a related problem) of being able to cope
with the bureaucracy.
In a sense, what this means is that armies never really
stand 'outside' society: their political functions, their
recruitment and career patterns, their organizational stru-
ctures, all reflect different aspects of the societies of which
they are part. Thus, for example, in both the Sudan and Somalia
the young officers have tended to be the cutting edge of the
nationalist educated elite. In both countries, the same com-
bination of widespread nationalist sentiment, a corrupt ruling
class and thrusting petty bourgeois ambition which fuelled the
Egyptian Free Officers movement was present. In the Somali
case, diplomatic ties forged with the Soviet Union in the early
years of independence, and consequent defence agreements,
helped to give a further leftward impetus to army politics,
whereas in the Sudan it was the intelligentsia outside rather
than within the army which espoused Marxism. In Uganda or Bu-
rundi, by contrast, tribal origin counted for far more in the
military context than did ideology or class origin, and one
effect of the military seizure of power was to make the ethnic
composition of the armed forces of immediate, and ultimately
in both cases tragic, importance.
Once in power, in other words, military leaderships tend
to "soak up social conflict like a sponge", in Ruth First's
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memorable phrase. 1 That is, the military organization im-
mediately becomes vulnerable to social and political pres-
sures from which it was hitherto to some extent protected,
and is required to operate under conditions and for purposes
for which it was not designed. In this situation of a leader-
ship ill equipped to deal with policy-making and politics,
an immediate and at times obviously dependent alliance with
the established bureaucracy often occurs. At the same time,
the pivotal position of the bureaucracy is enhanced by the
characteristic diffículty of military regimes in establish-
ing anything approaching an organised popular base, or even
an alternative means of communication with the population.
General barrack-room populist style and General Mobutu
Sese campaign in Zaire may represent
one kind of attempt to establish a non-bureaucratic, non-
military following of sorts. Another classic pattern is for
the military dictator to confer on himself, usually through
election or referendum, a certain civilian legitimacy as
President, as President Nimeiri has now done, and to construct
a national political organization of sorts.
It seems that this last is the most difficult task of
all, and yet clearly an essential one if there is to be any
hope of military governments being transformed (if in the
particular case they contain any such potential) into re-
sponsive and effective governments, capable of formulating
implementing development policies relevant to the lives of
most of their people. There are, heaven knows, plenty of
examples of the other, pathological kind, of corrupt and in-
effectual African military regimes, whose brutality may be
tempered by inefficiency in the traditional manner, but whose
numbing effect on the struggle to escape from poverty is hardly
tempered at all.
The Somali regime is particularly interesting in this
context, both for its efforts to establish political and
ideological bridgeheads among the people, and for its attempts
to re-make the country's civil service in its own image by the
use of orientation courses and the like. (A possible sign that
the regime is on the right path is the fact that Somali civil
servants have had to be told several times that they are wrong
to suppose that the courses are designed to 'punish' them for
1
Ruth First, The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa
and the Coup d'Etat, Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1970;
Penguin Books, 1972.
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past sins.) In these efforts, one may note, the Somali leaders
are beginning to confront problems very similar to those en-
countered in a rather different political context by the
Tanzanians - i.e. those of effecting radical changes in eco-
nomy and society, changes which will very quickly raise
questions about the power and privileges, and even the way
of life, of the educated elite in charge of the instruments
of policy. It may thus be in the capacity to transform itself
rather than others that the central dilemma of the genuinely
reformist or revolutionary military governments resides.
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